Pasi Tuunainen. 1 Matti Lauerma, Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 27: Vaiheet ja vaikutus. Porvoo 1966, passim.

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1 The transfer of military knowledge and the Finnish War of Independence (Civil War) The Finnish volunteers in the Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion 27 as adopters and disseminators of the German art of war, Pasi Tuunainen At the start of this paper, I should like to foreground two dates in Finnish history in the second decade of the 20 th century that appear to be linked in interesting and significant ways. Firstly, and most profoundly, Finland gained its independence from Russia in late But secondly, it is also worth noting that from early 1915 some 1900 young Finnish volunteer activists had travelled clandestinely to Germany for military training. The objective of the training was to train the leadership cadre for the future Finnish White Army. The Finnish contingent of the German army was named the Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion 27 (Königlich Preussisches Jägerbataillon Nr. 27). The Finns were deployed to combat duties in mid-1916 for a year, and they saw limited action on the Eastern Front in the Baltic area. The idea of actual experience of war was that this would supplement their training. By 1917, therefore, the Jaeger Battalion had become solely a training unit, and they received specialist military training in companies representing various arms. 1 1 In February 1918 the majority of the Jaegers returned home, where the Finnish War of Independence (Civil War) had broken out between the legitimate government s White Army and the rebellious Red Guards. Both belligerents received external assistance from the Germans and the Swedes and from the Red Russian soldiers, respectively. Some 1260 Jaegers participated in the Finnish War of Independence fought between 28 January and 16 May Altogether, some 400 Jaegers were promoted to the officer ranks, and approximately 660 of them became NCOs. The Jaegers were not, however, permitted to stay together as a unitary strike force. Instead they were assigned variously to Civil Guard units, to join enlisted troops, and to Jaeger units, a diversity that gave them the 1 Matti Lauerma, Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 27: Vaiheet ja vaikutus. Porvoo 1966, passim.

2 opportunity to propagate the German art of war and to take widespread advantage of their first-hand experience of war. In the Finnish White Army, most of the Jaegers served as instructors, company commanders, and platoon leaders, and thus they occupied the kind of positions in which they were able to exert influence in training and combat situations at the tactical level of war. Both sides had problems related to training, and the war has been aptly called the war of the amateurs 2. Despite this, and largely as a result of the input of the Jaegers, the White Army won the war in mid-may In this paper I will ignore the substance of the Jaeger training, focusing instead on the transfer of military knowledge and its learning process, the adoption and utilization of new knowledge concerning German combat methods, and the dissemination and deployment of these methods to the benefit of the White Army. My main questions are, in consequence, concerned with discovering the factors that contributed or hindered the knowledge transfer, and the degree to which it was successful. The Transfer And Absorption Of Knowledge While in Germany the Finnish Jaegers were learning by doing, an experience that improved their skills. Thus, their military knowledge was explicit rather than tacit, of a kind that could be shared and communicated without incurring larger problems. This military knowledge was codified in manuals, a form that made its transfer fast. The Jaegers prepared the command lexicon and wrote a 1500-page Finnish Soldiers Handbook, which was, however, based on the earlier German military professional literature and manuals published before World War I. The translated texts reflect the training the Jaegers had received in 1917 but also reveal the extent to which they failed to draw upon the lessons of the latter part of the Great War. There is nothing Finnish about the Finnish Soldier s 2 2 The phrase has been coined by Aapo Roselius. See Aapo Roselius, Amatöörien sota: Rintamataisteluiden henkilötappiot Suomen sisällissodassa Helsinki Ohto Manninen, Kansannoususta armeijaksi: Asevelvollisuuden toimeenpano ja siihen suhtautuminen valkoisessa Suomessa kevättalvella Helsinki 1974, ; Jarkko Kemppi, Suomalaisen sotataidon kehittyminen vuosina Helsinki 2006, 67; Jarkko Kemppi, Isänmaan puolesta: Jääkäriliikkeen ja jääkärien historia. Hämeenlinna 2011, 67, 82 91; Martti Santavuori, Suomen sotahistoria. Part II: Suomen vapaussota yleismaailmallisen sodan osana. Helsinki 1943, See also Lauerma 1966,

3 Handbook, yet it was the only broadly coherent guidance available to the military leaders participating in the Finnish War of Independence. 4 The German military knowledge that they had acquired was not excessively complex or specific, and thus it was suitable for imitation. On the other hand, the Finns had no other models to adopt, and, from their perspective, the German model, looked promising. Since the Jaegers unit had been incorporated into the German Army, they worked in close co-operation with their German trainers. In fact, the collaboration continued beyond 1917 because some German officers and troops accompanied the Jaegers to Finland. Thus, the Finnish War of Independence was a kind of joint venture involving both White Finns and Germans. The collaborative processes favored the absorption of knowledge. The Germans did not filter their knowledge, and they remained transparent and open towards the Finns, disclosing all of the knowledge that was of relevance to them. After all, the two shared a goal to weaken their common enemy, Russia. 5 The Jaegers were able to absorb the knowledge with relative ease. They were active knowledge seekers, and they possessed enough prior experience of the German military culture. The Jaegers became familiar and comfortable with the information content and context, which thus affected their learning and produced favorable conditions for the transfer of knowledge. The high motivation of the Jaegers resulted in positive learning outcomes. The learning capacity and cognitive skills of the Jaegers, many of whom were university students or otherwise educated, were also an important factor. The knowledge-base of the Jaegers and their experience and tactical know-how had been accumulating over a period of three years, offering them the important background factor of a deeper personal understanding. The prior knowledge and skills that the Jaegers and the average Germans shared were not that great. Their training was identical, and the Jaegers achieved standards that were similar to those of the German soldiers. The differences in their knowledge-bases did not prevent the 3 4 The Handbook was, to a large extent, based on Hermann Lehnert s Handbuch für den Truppenführer. Berlin Seppo Haario, Jääkäreiden toimittama Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja ja sen merkitys itsenäisen Suomen puolustusvoimille. Treatise. Finnish National Defence College 1981, 13, 37 38, 41 42, 61 65; Lauerma 1966, 296, , See also Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja. Parts 1 3. Berlin 1917 and Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja. Parts IV VIII. Helsinki and the draft of the Handbook. The Records of the Office of War History, Finnish General Staff , T 20252/2 (Yleisesikunta, Sotahistoriallinen toimisto), Finnish National Archives, Helsinki 5 Kemppi 2011, 13 15; Lauerma 1966, , 271, , , About the German involvement in the Finnish War of Independence see copies of the records of the German Ostsee-Division, ID (Vapaussota-arkisto: Saksalaiset joukot Suomessa), Finnish National Archives, Helsinki and R. Arimo, Saksalaisten sotilaallinen toiminta Suomessa Jyväskylä 1991, passim.

4 integration of knowledge nor did it make their learning particularly difficult. These were factors, indeed, that bridged the gap. 6 In terms of cultural distance and differences, Finns and Germans had possessed shared social and educational ties since the late-medieval period. The combat training programme for the majority of the Jaegers, for example, did not have to be specially modified. A potential language barrier was not an issue, either, since the German language is a close relative of Swedish, which was then widely spoken in Finland. In addition, the German language was the lingua franca of the entire Baltic Sea Region. In other words, language caused no subsequent misunderstandings or problems in the interpretation of the military information. 7 With the discontinuation of the Russian military tradition in Finland at the start of the 20 th century, the (national) military and tactical tradition of the White Army was almost non-existent. Furthermore, acceptance of German influences and the German model was further promoted by the fact that the Jaegers actively disliked Russian military traditions. 8 Thus, in this case the transfer of knowledge should be viewed not only as a process of transmission and reception but also as one of (re)construction. 4 The Finnish Art Of War In 1918 The fighting in 1918 was largely about studying and replicating German combat methods, but it also included some improvisations. 9 Nevertheless, the Jaegers were unable to properly apply novel methods amidst the peculiar features of Finland. Most of the Jaegers served in six Jaeger (elite infantry) regiments commanded by German officers and made up of young conscripts. The ranks of these regiments, which were attached to the White 6 Matti Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? Jääkäreiden tuntematon historia. Keuruu 2000, 201, 205; Lauerma 1966, , , , Interview with Professor Jukka Korpela, 29 January, 2008; Jussi Nuorteva, Suomalaisten ulkomainen opinkäynti ennen Turun akatemian perustamista Helsinki 1997, , , , , , ; Lauerma 1966, 148, Wolf H. Halsti, Suomen sota Part 1: Talvisota Keuruu 1955, Y.A. Järvinen, Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa. Porvoo 1948, 15.

5 Army in early April 1918, were reasonably well trained, and they were in fact the only Finnish belligerents capable of mounting counter-blows and even far-flank movements. 10 The concept of Schwerpunkt (i.e. point of main effort) is essential to the German art of war. 11 The Whites failed to focus their energy, with the consequence that they, like the Reds, dispersed their forces too widely. Typically, troops were sent to attack numerous places at the same time, and as the objectives designated were at a distance from each other, the attacks frequently became simply uncoordinated thrusts. To a large extent, the operations were mobile, with the White side aiming at the enemy s weak spots, frequently attempting to envelop the Red formations. If this happened, the Reds normally retreated. In many instances, however, the belligerents simply attempted to force their enemy into retreat by means of frontal attacks. There were, occasionally, attempts to use German tactics and employ German combat techniques. When, for example, the objective of the Whites was to take a village or town, there were sometimes battles of encirclement. The Whites even had plans for a double-envelopment movement, but these Cannae-type operations were too difficult to conduct. No true annihilation battles were ever fought. 12 The German ideas of deep or elastic defense were not used by the Jaegers. The defensive positions of both belligerents were mainly prepared along the roads and hence they lacked depth. Positions were often dug on the outskirts of villages because the troops needed buildings for supplies and billeting. Any interception of the enemy was achieved by fire power generated by small arms and infantry support weapons. The artillery s role was not particularly significant. It did not lift its fire in the fashion of creeping barrages or conduct counter-battery fire tasks. Instead of aiming at enemy fighting positions, the White artillery mainly targeted houses, command posts, and bivouacs J.O. Hannula, Suomen vapaussodan historia. Porvoo 1934, ; Lappalainen 1981, 218; Jarl Kronlund et al., Suomen puolustuslaitos : Puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan historia. Porvoo 1988, 58 59; Hj. Raatikainen, Taktiikka Suomen vapaussodassa. Tiede ja ase No. 4/1936, 39, See, for example, Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, Lawrence 2002, xviii. 12 Daily Order (No. 1031) of White General C.G.E. Mannerheim, 25 March 1918 (Päiväkäskyt), Finnish National Archives, Helsinki; Santavuori 1943, ; Uljas Rauanheimo, Kaarrostuksen ja saarron sotilaspsykologinen vaikutus. In Maanpuolustuskunto ja kansalainen. Ed. Rafael Engelberg et al. Helsinki 1938, ; Raatikainen 1936, 27 32, 40 41; J. Kivikari, Punaisten voimien offensiivinen sodankäynti Suomen vapaussodassa. Tiede ja ase No. 2/1934; 43; K.J. Mikola, Vapaussodan sotataito ja sotakokemukset. Sotilasaikakauslehti No. 1/1958, 3 4; Y.W. Sourander, Vapaussodan punainen armeija sodankäyntivälineenä. Tiede ja ase No. 1/1933, 36 39, 50 51; Jussi T. Lappalainen, Punakaartin sota. Part 1. Helsinki 1981, Santavuori 1843, About the elastic defense-in-depth see, for example, Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Fort Leavenworth 1981, About novel firing methods see, for example, Georg Bruchmüller, Die artillerie beim Angriff im Stellungskrieg. Charlottenburg

6 The offensive combat methods of both sides were similar to those practiced in the first half of World War I. For the Whites the most typical attack formation was a line. After staging a short dash forward and making contact, the platoon line stopped in order to fire. The advance was then continued as soon as the enemy had been shaken and favorable conditions for a charge with fixed bayonets had been created. Because the line was slow and had poor striking power, the Whites used several consecutive waves advancing with fire and movement in a synchronized mode. If their advance halted, the troops, instead of consolidating their gains, were pulled back. They often avoided forests and darkness because it would have been difficult to maintain their line formations and control the troops. Despite this, in many of the Whites operations they achieved and retained the initiative. While the Reds often used their troops en masse in open spaces, the Whites, led by the Jaegers, sometimes attempted to apply primitive open order tactics, which, in principle, proved useful in the densely afforested Finnish terrain. 14 In at least one incident the Whites applied innovative storm troop tactics, in which the Jaegers had taken courses, to capture a major town. This daring plan, designed by a German battalion commander, to breach the Red lines did not, however, work because many of the poorly trained and inexperienced men panicked. In this we may identify the German emphasis on tempo as well as deep penetration , passim and David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery. Westport 1994, passim. 14 Sourander 1933, 50 51; Raatikainen 1936, 33 35, 38; Santavuori 1943, 122, 202. See also W. Balck, Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege. Berlin 1922, passim, Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army s Art of Attack. New Haven 1994, 47 64, and (Pascal Marie Henri) Lucas, L évolution des Idées Tactiques: En France et en Allemagne pendant la Guerre de Paris 1923, passim. 15 Recollections of K.E. Levälahti (Kantahenkilökunnan vapaussotamuistelmia). Pk 869/6, Finnish National Archives, Helsinki; Matti Lauerma, Jääkäripataljoona 27:n valmistautuminen vapaussotaan. In Neljän vuosikymmen takaa: Tutkielmia ja muistikuvia. Helsingin yliopiston ylioppilaskunta. Porvoo 1958, 69; Konrad Vestlin, Melinin komppania. Helsinki 1939, 70 98; Sampo Ahto, Sotaretkillä. In: Itsenäistymisen vuodet Part 2: Taistelu vallasta. Ed. Ohto Manninen. Helsinki 1993, ; Timo Malmi, Rynnäkkö läpi Tampereen. Saarijärvi 2011, passim. About Stormtroop tactics see Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg. Berlin 1918, passim; Hellmuth Gruss, Aufbau und Verwendung der Deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg. Dresden 1939, passim, Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop tactics: Innovation in the German Army, Binghamton 1989, passim, Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, London 1995, and Ralf Raths, Vom Massensturm zur Stoßtrupptaktik: Die deutsche Landkriegtaktik im Spiegel von Dienstvorschriften und Publizistik 1906 bis Potsdam 2009.

7 While the Germans placed their emphasis on reconnaissance, concealment, deception, and the proper use of terrain, the White Army found such actions problematic, and hence it failed to achieve surprise or to exploit its successes. 16 Command Style Of The Jaegers Most of the Jaegers commanded much larger units than they had been trained to do. The command style of the Jaegers resembled German mission-type tactics (Auftragstaktik) 17, including delegation of authority. Nevertheless, the Jaegers also favored a Prussian style of discipline and demanded strict obedience of their subordinates. The Jaegers themselves lacked higher leadership training, but they believed in their cause, and their fighting spirit was high. They excelled in the combat skills required of an individual soldier and thus served as examples to the rank and file under their command. The Jaegers led from the front. Their morale was higher than that of many of those whom they led, but they were often able to inspire trust, establish an esprit de corps and fighting spirit among their troops. The Jaegers exhibited courage and valor in battles, with the consequence that they suffered relatively high casualties more than 10 per cent of them were killed in action. 18 Conclusion 7 The Jaeger movement was organized to facilitate the transfer of military knowledge from Germany to Finland. This transfer of knowledge was a straightforward process consisting of the transfer of knowledge important to the mission of the White Army. Personal and organizational learning took place because it encountered no significant cultural or other obstacles. Military knowledge was, in fact, learned by the Jaegers and then applied in a suitable context. They successfully assimilated German knowledge to such a degree that it gave them a slight advantage over the Reds. This German knowledge was put to the test on the battlefields of 1918, but its success was only partial because its application fell short. There was too little time for the recruits to receive proper training, and circumstances did not permit thorough adaptation of the German art of war to Finnish conditions (the 16 Raatikainen 1936, 26 29; Santavuori 1943, See, for example, Martin Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. Westport 1992, 87 96, 108, 141 and Samuels 1995, 10 18, 31 33, , Recollections of T. Hännikäinen, K.E Immonen and K.E. Levälahti (Kantahenkilökunnan vapaussotamuistelmia). Pk 869/2 3, 6, Finnish National Archives, Helsinki; Ohto Manninen, Saksa tyrmää Ruotsin-Suomen unionin. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja No. 3/1975, 233; Santavuori 1943, ; Lauerma 1966,

8 Finnish terrain, for example, was not described in the Finnish Soldiers Handbook). 19 In the end, the Jaegers lacked knowledge of the latest German battle-proven combat methods 20 used in the final stages of the Great War. Instead, they were simply imitating earlier German combat tactics and techniques dating back to the start of World War I and at times to even earlier periods. The consequence was that the Whites were not capable of performing in a truly superior manner, with the chance of bringing the war to a quicker end. The dissemination and use of the German art of war by the Finnish Army did not end in the spring of 1918: the offensive spirit remained until the end of the 1930s. The Finns placed a heavy emphasis on the battle of encirclement, and the role played by the Jaeger officers was vital in the construction of the new army during the interwar period. 21 References Archival sources in the Sörnäinen Branch of the Finnish National Archives (the former War Archives), Helsinki, Finland Daily Orders of White General C.G.E. Mannerheim 1918 (Päiväkäskyt) Recollections of T. Hännikäinen, K.E Immonen and K.E. Levälahti (Kantahenkilökunnan vapaussotamuistelmia) Records of the German Ostsee-Division 1918 (Vapaussota-arkisto: Saksalaiset joukot Suomessa) The Records of the Office of War History, Finnish General Staff (Yleisesikunta, Sotahistoriallinen toimisto) 8 Manuals Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg. Berlin Hermann Lehnert, Handbuch für den Truppenführer. Berlin Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja. Parts IV VIII. Helsinki Ari Raunio, Suomalainen taktiikka suuntaa etsimässä Taktiikan kehittämisen vaikeudet 1920-luvulla. Treatise. University of Helsinki 1989, About the last German offensives see, for example, Lupfer 1981, and David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War. Abingdon 2006, passim. 21 Vesa Tynkkynen, Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen: Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa. Joutsa 1996, passim and Pasi Tuunainen, Syöksyjoukot ja talvisodan mottitaktiikan synty: Suomalaiset saksalaisperäisen hyökkäystaktisen ja -taisteluteknisen innovaation omaksujina ja soveltajina An unpublished manuscript 2008, passim.

9 Treatises and unpublished manuscripts Seppo Haario, Jääkäreiden toimittama Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja ja sen merkitys itsenäisen Suomen puolustusvoimille. Treatise. Finnish National Defence College Ari Raunio, Suomalainen taktiikka suuntaa etsimässä Taktiikan kehittämisen vaikeudet luvulla. Treatise. University of Helsinki Pasi Tuunainen, Syöksyjoukot ja talvisodan mottitaktiikan synty: Suomalaiset saksalaisperäisen hyökkäystaktisen ja -taisteluteknisen innovaation omaksujina ja soveltajina An unpublished manuscript Articles and books Sampo Ahto, Sotaretkillä. In: Itsenäistymisen vuodet Part 2: Taistelu vallasta. Ed. Ohto Manninen. Helsinki R. Arimo, Saksalaisten sotilaallinen toiminta Suomessa Jyväskylä W. Balck, Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege. Berlin Georg Bruchmüller, Die artillerie beim Angriff im Stellungskrieg. Charlottenburg Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, Lawrence Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army s Art of Attack. New Haven Hellmuth Gruss, Aufbau und Verwendung der Deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg. Dresden Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop tactics: Innovation in the German Army, Binghamton Wolf H. Halsti, Suomen sota Part 1: Talvisota Keuruu J.O. Hannula, Suomen vapaussodan historia. Porvoo Y.A. Järvinen, Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa. Porvoo Jarkko Kemppi, Isänmaan puolesta: Jääkäriliikkeen ja jääkärien historia. Hämeenlinna Jarkko Kemppi, Suomalaisen sotataidon kehittyminen vuosina Helsinki J. Kivikari, Punaisten voimien offensiivinen sodankäynti Suomen vapaussodassa. Tiede ja ase No. 2/

10 Jarl Kronlund et al., Suomen puolustuslaitos : Puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan historia. Porvoo Matti Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? Jääkäreiden tuntematon historia. Keuruu Jussi T. Lappalainen, Punakaartin sota. Part 1. Helsinki Matti Lauerma, Jääkäripataljoona 27:n valmistautuminen vapaussotaan. In Neljän vuosikymmen takaa: Tutkielmia ja muistikuvia. Helsingin yliopiston ylioppilaskunta. Porvoo Matti Lauerma, Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 27: Vaiheet ja vaikutus. Porvoo (Pascal Marie Henri) Lucas, L évolution des Idées Tactiques: En France et en Allemagne pendant la Guerre de Paris Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Fort Leavenworth Timo Malmi, Rynnäkkö läpi Tampereen. Saarijärvi Ohto Manninen, Kansannoususta armeijaksi: Asevelvollisuuden toimeenpano ja siihen suhtautuminen valkoisessa Suomessa kevättalvella Helsinki Ohto Manninen, Saksa tyrmää Ruotsin-Suomen unionin. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja No. 3/1975. K.J. Mikola, Vapaussodan sotataito ja sotakokemukset. Sotilasaikakauslehti No. 1/1958. Jussi Nuorteva, Suomalaisten ulkomainen opinkäynti ennen Turun akatemian perustamista Helsinki Hj. Raatikainen, Taktiikka Suomen vapaussodassa. Tiede ja ase No. 4/1936. Ralf Raths, Vom Massensturm zur Stoßtrupptaktik: Die deutsche Landkriegtaktik im Spiegel von Dienstvorschriften und Publizistik 1906 bis Potsdam Uljas Rauanheimo, Kaarrostuksen ja saarron sotilaspsykologinen vaikutus. In Maanpuolustuskunto ja kansalainen. Ed. Rafael Engelberg et al. Helsinki Aapo Roselius, Amatöörien sota: Rintamataisteluiden henkilötappiot Suomen sisällissodassa Helsinki Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, London Martin Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. Westport Martti Santavuori, Suomen sotahistoria. Part II: Suomen vapaussota yleismaailmallisen sodan osana. Helsinki Y.W. Sourander, Vapaussodan punainen armeija sodankäyntivälineenä. Tiede ja ase No. 1/1933. Vesa Tynkkynen, Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen: Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa. Joutsa

11 Konrad Vestlin, Melinin komppania. Helsinki David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War. Abingdon David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery. Westport Interviews Interview with Professor Jukka Korpela 11