Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88

Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88 Statistics on Finland's military expenditure, as outlined in the following table, convey a slightly unrealistic picture of Finland's defence capabilities. Finland has consistently spent more money on defence than statistics reveal. For example, the appropriations of the border guard are not included in military budgets (since the border guard is under the Ministry of the Interior). Neither are major defence construction projects in central and northern Finland included in military budgets, as funds for these projects come from the budgets of other ministries. Furthermore, pensions are paid out of the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs and conscripts are paid even nowadays only a few pounds per day. It has been estimated that if Finland paid its conscripts the same rate that is paid in Denmark, Finland would have to increase its defence budget by 25 per cent. The adding of the expenditures of the Border Guard would increase the military budget by another 10 per cent. 163

164 Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure. 1960-88 Appendix 1: Total Government military Year GNP expenditures expenditures 1960 16199 3998 203 61 18362 4465 282 62 19661 4967 420 63 21352 4874 320 64 24083 5745 351 65 26634 6821 371 66 28554 7167 402 67 31321 8058 455 68 35908 9784 559 69 40986 10210 541 1970 45743 10781 584 71 50257 11944 656 72 58625 13 970 783 73 71364 16961 886 74 90055 21307 1063 75 104209 27546 1317 76 117643 31094 1514 77 129790 35064 1733 78 143376 38938 1962 79 166992 45036 2264 1980 192825 50812 2737 81 218817 57797 3071 82 246187 68008 3899 83 275230 77190 4180 84 309567 85748 4528 85 336824 95803 4881 86 360319 105178 5423 87 393608 116704 5658 88 435550 114247 6316

Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88 165 Military Expenditures 1960-88 Defence Military Defence Total military material expenditures material expenditures acquisitions % of all govt. acquisitions % of GNP % of GNP expenditures 70.0 1.25 0.43 5.08 91.4 1.54 0.5 6.32 220.7 2.14 1.12 8.46 95.0 1.5 0.44 6.57 111.2 1.46 0.46 6.11 128.4 1.39 0.48 5.44 117.3 1.41 0.41 5.61 123.7 1.45 0.39 5.65 116.0 1.56 0.32 5.71 90.2 1.32 0.22 5.3 115.9 1.28 0.25 5.42 148.6 1.31 0.3 5.49 200.3 1.34 0.34 5.6 224.7 1.24 0.31 5.22 246.2 1.18 0.27 4.99 283.9 1.26 0.27 4.78 282.8 1.29 0.24 4.87 369.7 1.34 0.28 4.94 485.4 1.37 0.34 5.04 630.1 1.36 0.38 5.03 840.3 1.42 0.44 5.39 842.1 1.4 0.38 5.31 1275.9 1.58 0.52 5.73 1246.4 1.52 0.45 5.42 1337.2 1.46 0.43 5.28 1416.6 1.45 0.42 5.09 1713.9 1.51 0.48 5.16 1719.1 1.44 0.44 4.85 1990.0 1.45 0.46 5.53 NOTE: Figures in millions of Finnish marks or in percentages. Figures for 1987 and 1988 are unconfirmed estimates. SOURCE: Finnish Ministry of Defence, Department of Military Affairs.

Notes Introduction 1. One could not, for example, use the strategy of defence in depth if the enemy was only interested in extracting certain border areas from the defending state. See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton 1976, p. 488. 2. C. L. Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, Bloomington 1957. 3. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, pp. 377-78, 384. 4. Ibid., p. 384. 5. Sampo Ahto, Aseveljet vastakkain, Lapin sota 1944-45, Helsinki 1980, p. 109. 1 'The Years of Danger', 1944-47 l. Lauri Hyvamaki, Vaaran vuodet, Helsinki 1954. 2. Article 22 of the Armistice Agreement. 3. See Reijo Ahtokari, Punainen Va/po. Valtiollinen poliisi Suomessa vaaran vuosina, Helsinki 1969, pp. 186-87. 4. The 1945 Government Policy Declaration called for the prosecution of war criminals and for the democratisation and 'cleaning up' of the police and the military forces. Jussi Raumolin, Puolustuspolitiikka ja 'Turvallisuuspolitiikan' opetus varusmiehille Suomessa, Kehityspiirteitii ja ongelmia, Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunniltelukunta, Helsinki 1977, p.25. 5. Emil Skog, Sosialisti ja Patrioolti muistelee, Porvoo 1971, pp. 259-6l. 6. Even the location of the Control Commission Headquarters - in the tallest building in Helsinki, the Hotel Tomi - was psychologically imposing. 7. J. K. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat 1944-1956, I Osa 28.6.1944-24.4.1949, ed. by Blomsted and Klinge, Juva 1985, p.33. 8. Helsingin Sanomat, 22 September, 1985. 9. See Blinnikka, Valvontakomission aika, p. 69. For details on the Control Commission's operations, see The Finnish War Archives, SA/T 20362/l. lo. See, Warner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics. The Fall of Zhdanov and the defeat of Moderation 1946-1953, Ithaca 1982, p. 28 and pp. lol-2. 1l. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p. 140. Molotov replied: 'Ach, Finland - that is a peanut'. 166

Notes to pp. 8-15 167 12. The US representative in Finland, Hamilton, reported to the Secretary of State on 17 March 1945 that the Control Commission had not 'taken any action vis-it-vis the Finnish Government which cannot be more or less clearly justified under the armistice terms'. Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, IV, p. 609. 13. 'Directive for British Section of Allied Control Commission in Finland', dated 12 October 1944, reproduced in J. H. Magill, Tasavalta tulikokeessa, Mikkeli 1981. 14. Stig Jagerskitild, Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland, London 1986, p.182. 15. Paasikivi cited rumours about Soviet occupation still in March 1949. See J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjatl, pp. 702fT. 16. Jagerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p. Ill. 17. Minister Fagerholm's account of discussion with Mannerheim, cited in Jagerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 111. 18. Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 234. Mannerheim referred to threatening movements by the German navy in the proximity of the Aland Islands. 19. Gustav Mannerheim's archives, kansio 614 VArk, cited in Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 235, reproduced in Jagerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p.129. 20. See: Martti Turtola, Heinrichs; Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 239; Jligerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 129; and Pekka Visuri, 'Puolustusvoimien sodanjaikeiset linjaratkaisut kestaneet', Helsingin Sanomat, 4 September 1985. 21. Sampo Ahto, 'The War in Lapland' in Kanninen (ed.), Aspects of Security, pp. 226-7. 22. Zhdanov's letter in The Finnish War Archives. SA T 19498/8 a. 23. The Finnish War Archives, Ark/Tl9527/376, appendix 1: the letter of appointment from the Ministry of Defence. 24. Pekka Visuri, 'Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys Keski-Euroopassa Toisen Maailmansodan jaikeen vertailtuna vastaavaan kehitykseen Suomessa', Tutkimus Suomen Sotatieteelliselle seuralle, Helsinki 15 February 1985, p. 165. 25. Erich Heinrich, 'Esitys Puolustusrevisiolle Suomen sotilaspoliittisesta tilanteesta ja asennoitumisesta 19. 6. 1945', Gustav Mannerheim's Archives, kansio 614 VArk, partially reproduced in Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 237. 26. Visuri, 'Puolustusvoimien sodanjaikeiset linjaratkaisut', Helsingin Sanomat, 4 June 1985. 27. Jussi Raumolin, 'Puolustuspolitiikan ja "Turvallisuuspolitiikan" opetus varusmiehille Suomessa', p. 26. 28. The 1945 Teaching Instructions (Valistustohjeet), cited in Raumolin, 'Puolustuspolitiikka ja 'Turvallisuuspolitiikan' opetus varusmiehille Suomessa, p. 27. 29. Ibid., p. 20.

168 NOles 10 pp. 16-20 30. Hannu Koskinen, 'Suomen Puolustusvoimat Iiittoutuneiden Valvontakomission aikana', Sotakorkeak:oulu MSL 38, Helsinki 30 July 1985, p. 34, 39. 31. Ibid., p. 39. 32. Ibid., p. 34. Then: is no record of Lundqvist's resignation in The Finnish War Archives. It is therefore possible that the President simply told him in person that he had to resign. 33. Ibid., p. 36. 34. General Sihvo's 1949 memorandum on the tasks of the defence forces, cited in Kalle Lehmus, Kolme kriisiii, Helsinki 1971. 35. Koskinen, 'Suomen Puolustusvoimat liittoutuneiden Valvontakomission aikana', p. 42. 36. Paasikivi,l. K. Paasikiven piiiviikiriatl, p. 148. 37. A summary of the work of the liaison committee and Zhdanov's letter to Paasikivi: SAlT 21 565/15, Finnish War Archives. 38. Paasikivi,l. K. Paasikiven piiiviikiriatl, p. 181. 39. The sentences met the minimum requirements set by the Control Commission, varying from two to ten years. 40. Jagerskiold, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 175, for fuller accounts see, Aladar Paasonen, Marsalkan tiedustelupiiiillikkbnii ja hallituksen asiamiehenii, Helsinki 1974, and Kakonen, Miehityksen varalta, Helsinki 1970. 41. The transfer was made 22 and 23 September 1944, see JagerskiOld, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 176. Rislakki puts the total number of the Finnish refugees at BOO, Rislakki, erittiiin salainen, p. 279. For an autobiographical account of the operation see Harry Lewing, Oneraatio Stella Polaris, Helsinki 1977. 42. On the duration of the operation see Eduskunnan Pbytiikirjat 1950 IV, p.4184. 43. Rislakki, Erittiiin salainen, p. 275,279. 44. Ibid., pp. 273-4. See also Reijo Ahtokari, Punainen Valpo, pp. 172-4. 45. See e.g. Hyvamaki, Vaaran vuodel, p. 35; Lukkari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp. 21, 260, 265; Hannu Rautkallio, Suomen suunta 1945-48, Savonlinna 1974, p. 107-12. 46. Reijo Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, p. 54. 47. Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 222, Kairinen, Marttisen miehet, p. 11, Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, pp. 24, 28, and Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp.12-14. 48. Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp. 12-14. Same figures reproduced in Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 26, 27. 49. According to Kairinen preparations were begun on 22 September; according to Tervasmaki they were begun on 23 September; and according to Lukkari on 24 September. See, respectively: Kairinen, Marttisen miehet, p. 9; Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 222; and Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 34. Ahtokari claims that initial preparations were begun on 15 September; see Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp. 25-33.

Notes to pp. 20-7 169 50. See, for example, Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, pp. 22-4 and Rautkallio. Suomen suunta, p. 107. 51. See EduskunnanpOytiikirjat 1950 IV, p. 4170-71. 52. Bartenjev and Komissarov, Kolmelcymmentii vuotta hyviiii naapuruutta, p. 63. 53. Ahtokari, Punainen Val po, p. 18. 54. Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 137. 55. Paasikivi,l. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 154, 159. 56. Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 5, see also Paasikivi, 1. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 164. 57. Arrested officers were not given adequate health care, they were isolated from each other, and their statements were often falsified. See for example, A. F. Airo, Liikekannallepano salaliitto, Tampere 1978. 58. See Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, Chapter 5. 59. TervasmIDd, Mannerheim, p.225; Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, pp. 270-5. 60. Tuomo Polvinen, laltasta Pariisin rauhaan, Suomi Kansainviilisessii politiikassa III: 1945-1947, Juva 1981, p. 227. 61. T. Polvinen, laltasta Pariisin rauhaan. p.239. The dispute over. torpedo boats began when France demanded that Italy should not be allowed to possess them. Subsequently, Greece demanded a similar prohibition for Bulgaria. Finally Great Britain wanted the prohibition to be extended to all former enemies. 62. The Aland islands were declared neutral by the League of Nations as long ago as 1921, after a dispute between Finland and Sweden. 63. If one takes into account all military-related expenditure then the range is between 4.9% (in 1949) and 7.4% (in 1955). In the 1930's (excluding 1939) the figure had been between 20% and 25%. Vilho Harle and Perui Joenniemi, Valkoinen kirja, p. 21. 64. Visuri, 'Puolustusperiaatteiden kelintys' pp. 163, 167. 2 The Cold War Reaches the North, 1948-49 1. Dick Stenberg, 'F1ygvapnet 1927-76', Kunliga Krigsvetenskapsakademins Handlingar och Tidskrift, 4/1976, p.57, cited in Ren~ Nyberg, Pohjolan Turvallisuus ja Suomi, Ydinaseiden viihenevii merkitys, Helsinki, 1983. 2. Swedish Social Democrats in 1923 cited in Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden 1918-1939, London, 1949, p.159. 3. See Karl Molin, 'Winning the Pcacc' in Nielsen (ed.), Scandinavian Countries in the Second World War, p. 367. 4. Molin, 'Winning the Peace', p. 368. 5. Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfrihet och Atombomber, kontinuitet och foriindring i den svenska forsvarsdoktrin 1945-1982, Lund 1985, p.126. 6. Molin, 'Winning the Peace', pp. 368-9.

170 Notes to pp. 28-32 7. See 'Plan for en fj1jrste reising av Norges forsvar' in J. J. Holst. Norsk Sikkerhetspolitik i Strategisk Pespektiv, Bind l/: Dokumentasjon, pp.25-6. 8. Ibid., pp. 19-21. 9. Niels Jj1jrgen Haagerup, A Brief Introduction to Danish Foreign Policy and Defence, Copenhagen 1980, p. 8. 10. TItis build-up was motivated by a determination to prevent another military occupation. This was expressed in the much-used slogan 'Never again a Ninth of April'. Ibid., p. 8. 11. Ibid., p. 369. 12. Cars, Skoglund & Zetterberg, Svensk forsvarspolitik under efterkrigstid, Stockholm 1986, pp. 11-17 13. J. Raymond Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsingistii Washingtoniin. Muistelmia ja dokumentteja vuosilta 1946-1948, Helsinki 1978, p.215. 14. J. SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, Helsinki 1970, p. 113. 15. Mannerheim's letter to Count Bemadotte, cited in Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsingista Washingtoniin, p. 2:>A. 16. SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, p. 113. 17. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 562. Turning down negotiations would have seriously damaged Finland's carefully cultivated relationship with the Soviet Union. 18. Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, p. 177. 19. Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsingistii Washingtoniin, p. 250. 20. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 558,579. 21. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat. I, pp. 562-567. 22. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 567; SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, p. 117, 119. 23. See SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, p. 113, 124, and R. T. A. Luoto, 'Sopimus Ystlivyydestli, Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton viilisen Ystavyys-, Yhteistyo-, ja Avunantosopimuksen merkitys Suomen Turvallisuuspolitiikassa 1948-78', Tampere 1978, p. 17. 24. Luoto, 'Sopimus Ystavyydesta. Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton viilisen Ystavyys-, Yhteistyo-ja Avunantosopimuksen merkitys Suomen Turvallisuuspolitiikassa 1948-78', p. 23. 25. Sotilasaikakauslehti, 11/1971. 26. The USSR concluded bilateral treaties of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia in 1943, with Poland and Yugoslavia in 1945, with Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria in 1948. See Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties, Stanford 1962, p. 239. 27. The differences between the Finnish and other FCMA-type treaties are elaborated in Kalevi Ruhala 'Puolustussopimukset kansainvlilisessa oikeudessa', Tiede ja Ase, 30/1972. 28. The fact that Zhdanov, who had advocated the inclusion of Finland into the Soviet bloc, was rapidly losing his position in the Kremlin, may

Notes to pp. 32-5 171 have contributed to the Soviet readiness to conclude a 'mild' treaty with Finland. The first signs of Zhdanov's fall from favour were detected in 1947. From the beginning of 1948 his public appearances became rare. He disappeared from the Soviet leadership in July 1948 and died in August 1948. See W. G. Hahn, Postwar Soveit Politics. The Fall ofzhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation 1946-1953, pp. 101-2. 29. To add to the Soviet uncertainty over Finnish reactions, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament deliberately leaked information to the Soviet representatives revealing that 'any negotiations for a FCMA Treaty were, from the Finnish view, 'very serious and our demands unconditional'. Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 30. 30. Paasikivi, Paasikiven linja I. Puheita vuosilta 1944-56, pp.98-101. After this he repeated in essence what he had said in February 1947: Finland would defend itself if an attack were attempted through Finland against the Soviet Union, if it did not have enough resources then it would get assistance from the Soviet Union. 31. See e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 14 March 1948: 'Sopimus ei aiheuta muutoksia Suomen kansainvalisissa suhteissa'. 32. Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, Repon no. 20 Helsinki 26 April 1948, cited in Osmo Apunen, Kansallinen realismi ja Puolueettomuus Suomen ulkopoliitlisina valintoina, Tampere 1972, Appendix 2. 33. Roy Allison uses the expression 'FCMA-type treaties' to convey that these treaties were not identical. Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 24. 34. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision MielintO. Osa I, submitted 10 March 1949; Part II/I and Part 11/2 submitted 10 June 1949; Part III submitted 18 November 1948. 35. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision mietinto. Osa I, p. 15. 36. Ibid., p. 16. 37. See, Lauri Haataja, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' in Haataja et al., Paasikiven hirmuiset vuodet. 38. See e.g. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat, p.602. Paasikivi's diaries lack several entries around this time. This has led certain scholars in Finland to suggest that Paasikivi edited parts of his diaries for publication before his death. See also Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 297, and Ahtokari Punainen Valpo, pp. 158-61. 39. Repon by Scott, 29 April 1948, FO 371/11405/N5763. 40. See Helsingin Sanomat, 17 January 1986. 41. Zhdanov's report on the international situation, 22 September 1947. M. Rush (ed.), The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy, Columbus, Ohio 1970, p. 130. 42. See, A. F. Upton, The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, London 1973, p. 290. 43. See, Haataja, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' in Haataja, et al. (ed.),

172 Notes to pp. 35-9 Paasikiven hirmuiset vuodet. Suomi 1944-48, Helsinki 1986, p. 31. 44. Krosby, 'The Communist Power Bid in Finland in 1948', p. 237. 45. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat, pp. 601, 602. 46. Paasikivi gave his approval after an official request from the Commander-in-Chief. Finnish War Archives, SArkT23828/FI3: 'Esittely tasavallan Presidentille'. 47. Haatia, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' pp.31-4. Most of Haatia's information on military measures taken at the time is based on Ari Raunio, 'Valmiuden kohottaminen Suomen puolustusvoimissa vuonna 1948', Proseminaariesitelma 10 November 1985, University of Helsinki, Department of Political History. 48. Ibid., pp. 31-4. See also Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, pp. 241, 247. 49. Haatia, 'Vaaran vuodetja realismi', pp. 31-4. 50. Ibid., pp. 31-4. 51. Ibid., pp. 31-4. 52. Haatia, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' pp. 32-4. Also see, Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat, p. 580; Krosby, 'The Communist Power Bid in Finland', p. 232: the new storage of arms was underneath the Helsinki Cathedral. 53. Ahtokari, Punainen Valpo, p. 161. 54. Krosby, 'The Communist Power Bid in Finland', p. 238. 55. Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 297. 56. The chief of police related his concerns to President Paasikivi, see Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjal/, p. 601. 57. Lauri Haataja, 'Tie helvettiin on laskettu os. objektiivisilla tekijoilla', Suomen Kuvalehti, 12 July 1985. 58. Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsinaislii Washingloniin, pp. 230-41. 59. Ibid., p. 231. 60. Nevakivi, Maanalaista diplomatiaa, pp. 104-5. 61. Hendersen, The Birth of NATO, p. 11. 62. Ibid., p. 11. 63. Ibid., p. 12. 64. A well-known example of the pessimistic attitude prevalent in the West is Lord Pakenham's speech in the House of Lords. Referring first to the coup in Czechoslovakia, Lord Pakenham concluded that in Stalin's letter the ill-fated Finnish government had received a 'kiss of death'. Ylitalo, Salasanomia Heisingistii Washingtoniin, p. 204. 65. Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, p. 205. 66. Trumans's 'message to Congress' cited in Skodvin, Norden eller NATO, p. 137. See also Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, p. 204. 67. Henderson, The Birth of Nato, p. 12 68. Nikolaj Petersen, 'Danish and Norwegian Alliance Policies 1948-49, a Comparative Analysis', Co-operation and Conflict, 1979/14, p. 200. 69. Ibid., p. 201. 70. On Norwegian contacts with Western diplomats see Skodven, Norden

Notes to pp. 39-43 173 eller NATO, pp. 96-107. On the Danish reaction to Stalin's letter to Finland see Harald Westergard Andersen, Dansk Politik i gar og i dag, p. 127, and W. G. Jones, Denmark, A Modern History, p. 175. 71. According to Agrell, the Swedish government now saw Finland as part of the Soviet sphere of interest. Agrell, Alliansfrihet och Atombomber, p. 62. 72. For a discussion of the Little Entente from the point of view of small states see Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, New York 1968, Chapter 4: 'The Little Entente and the Nature of Small Power Alliances'. Rothstein does not discuss the plan for a Scandinavian Defence Union. 73. See Rene Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, Ydinaseiden viihenevii merkitvs, Helsinki 1983, pp. 59-60. See also Agrell, Alliansfrihet och atombomber, pp. 126-7. 74. See H. Westergard Andersen, Dansk Politik i qar og i dag, p. 127. 75. See Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolitik i Strategisk Perspektiv, Bind II, pp. 19-22. 76. Incidentally, it was the same reason that led to the disintegration of the Little Entente. In the interwar years the need for guarantees rose out of an increase in Italian, and later German, pressure against the small states involved. In 1948-49 the need for outside guarantees resulted from a perceived increase in Soviet pressure against the Nordic area. 77. See Izvestia, 15 February 1949. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VoI.I:7/311949. 78. For an account of the meeting see Skodvin, Norden eller NATO, pp. 235-44. 79. Viiyrynen, Conflicts in Finno-Soviet Relations, p. 55. 80. See Kari Mottola, 'Nordic Perceptions of the Great Powers and Nordic Security' in Huldt and Lejins (eds), Security in the North: Nordic and Superpower Perceptions, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Conference papers 5, Stockholm 1984, pp. 29-31. 81. Norway had been united with Denmark (1397-814) and Sweden (1814-905) and had thus enjoyed full sovereignty for a relatively short time. 82. J. J. Holst, 'Nordic Security Concerns', a speech given at a meeting of the Strategic Studies Group in Oxford on 10 March 1987. 83. For a full account of the Danish policy see Udenrigsministeriet, Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948-66 1, Chapter II. 84. Rene Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 23. 85. 'Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on the North Atlantic Treaty', 31 March 1949, Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967,pp.125-9. 3 'Do Not Tease the Bear', 1949-55 1. Literaturnaya gazeta, 14 January 1950, CDSP, Volume II, No. 2, p. 30.

174 Notes to pp. 43-6 2. 'Hidden schemes for Aland Islands', Izvestia, 14 February 1950, CDSP Volume II, No.8, p. 23. 3. 'Influx of 'Tourists into Finland', Pravda, 17 August 1950, CDSP, Volume II, No. 33. 4. Izvestia, 14 June 1951, CDSP, Volume III, No. 24, p. 19. 5. 'Intensification of American Propaganda in Finland', Trud, 30 September 1951. CDSP, Volume ill, No. 39, p. 23. 6. 'Against Reactions Intrigues', Pravda, 2 October 1952, CDSP, Volume III, No. 40, p. 27. 7. 'In Finnish Diet', Pravda, 13 October 1951. CDSP, Volume III, No. 41, p. 16. 8. 'Gross Violation of Finnish Sovereignty', Izvestia, 14, October 1951. CDSP, Volume III, No. 41, p. 16. 9. 'Vigilance of the Finnish Working People', Izvestia, 8 December 1951, CDSP, Volume III, No. 49, p. 20. 10. 'On Fourth Anniversary of Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance', Izvestia, 6 April 1952. CDSP, Volume IV, No. 14, p. 22. 11. 'The Political situation in Finland', Bolshevik, No. 22, 1950, pp. 63-6. CDSP, Volume II, No. 50, p.8. The Soviet press used the term 'Schutzkorps', adopted from Swedish, to describe the outlawed Suojeluskunta organisation. This term was never used in Finland. 12. Izvestia, 6 February 1951, CDSP, Volume III, No.6, p. 18. 13. Pravda, 15 April 1951, CDSP Volume III, No. 15, p. 16. Trud used the phrase 'the neo-fascist Finnish Federation of Reserve officers'; see Trud, 6 June 1951, CDSP Volume III, No. 23, p. 15. 14. Pravda, 15 April 1951, CDSP Volume III, No. 15, p. 16. Vaino Tanner, according to whom the Tannerites were named, was a Social Democrat and the Finnish Foreign Minister during the war. He was convicted as a war criminal after the war. After serving his sentence he returned to politics as the chairman of the Social Democratic Party. 15. Conversation between President Paasikivi and Prime Minister Kekkonen on 23 May 1950 cited in Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 119. 16. The Commander-in-Chief kept Paasikivi informed through memorandums on important questions. See e.g. a memorandum on the military implications of the presence the Soviet troops in Porkkala and on Finland's military prepredness. Memorandum received on 27 July 1950. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 128. 17. Paasikivi on 11 April 1951, Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p.209. 18. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 697. 19. 10 April 1950, ibid., p. 106. 20. Ibid., p. 105. 21. 10 April 1950, Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 105.

Notes to pp. 46-51 175 22. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 106. 23. Speech on 6 April 1951. Kekkonen, Puheita ja Kirjoituksia, Helsinki 1955, pp. 220-4. 24. Hiillcio, 'YYA-sopimuksen konsultaatioartiklan suomalainen tulkinta', p.43. 25. This speech is called the 'Pyjama speech' since, because of illness, Kekkonen did not deliver it orally. Urho Kekkonen, Neutrality, the Finnish Position, London 1970, trans. Ojansuu and Keyworth, p. 55. 26. Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka, Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkonen turvallisuuspoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943-1979, Helsinki 1980, p. 27. 27. 'Speech by Finnish Prime Minister Kekkonen', Pravda, 27 January 1952. CDSP, Volume IV, No.4, p. 15. 28. 'On Fifth Anniversary of Soviet-Finnish Treaty', Pravda, 6 April 1953. CDSP, Volume V, No. 14, p. 16. 29. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat II, p. 425, 21 June 1954. 30. Term used by Professor Viitasalo, Head of the Finnish Military Science Research Institute (Sotatieteellinen tutkimuslaitos) in Helsinki. Interview with Professor Mikko Viitasalo, Helsinki 18 June, 1985. 31. N. A. A. Simojoki, 'Nykytyyppisen ilmatorjuntatykiston ajankohtaista arviointia', Tiede ja Ase 8/1950, p. 189: the poor materiel preparedness of the anti-aircraft artillery was 'as much a crisis connected with the defensive capabilities of the air force'. 32. The term of service was one year for general conscripts and 15 months for those receiving reserve officer's or non-commissioned-officer's training. 33. Tervasmaki, Puolustushallinto, p. 265. 34. Y. E. Jiirvinen, 'Yleissotatieteellinen katsaus vuosien 1949 ja 1950 vaihteessa', Tiede ja Ase, 8/1950. 35. Ibid., p. 8. 36. Ibid., pp. 34, 40. 37. V. Koppinen, 'VesistohyokkayksisUi ja niiden torunnasta', Tiede ja Ase, 8/1950. V. Koppinen, 'Viivytystaktiikasta', SAL 1/1950.1. KiveliO, 'Rannikkojoukkojenkehityksesta', TiedejaAse, 8/1950. R. A. Rautasaari, 'Metslipuolustus vai avomaapuolustus', SAL 2/1949. 38. War Archives, PK 1084/38. 39. B. W. Kontiopliii, 'II Maailmansodan vastarintaliikkeista ja niistli tehtlivistli johtoplilitoksistli', Tiede ja Ase 9/1951. 40. For example, Nurmi, 'Sissitoiminta Talvisodassa ja sen kehitys vv. 1941-44 sodan loppuun mennessa', SAL, 4/49 and 'Sissitoiminta tulevaisuuden sodassa', SAL, 3/1950. 41. Nurmi, 'Sissitoiminta tulevaisuuden sodassa', SAL 3/1950. 42. A Permanent Directive Concerning Teaching in the Defence Forces, (Valistustyotli koskeva pysyvliisklisky), 6 May 1953, cited in Jussi Raumolin, 'Puolustuspolitiikka ja "turvallisuuspolitiikan" opetus varusmiehille Suomessa', p. 37.

176 Notes to pp. 52-5 43. Ibid., pp. 37-8. 44. Not everyone in the Finnish armed forces recalls these attempts to single out the West as a likely aggressor. For example, a group of ten Finnish air force officers who had all served in the early 1950s denied that such views were ever put forward - 'at least not with any seriousness'. Interview with the postwar commanders of the Karelian Wing of the Finnish Air Force, Helsinki, 2 April 19187. 45. War Archives PK 1084/38. Lectures in tactics at the Staff College 1946-1952 (dossier number 29). 'War and map exercises 1946-1952' (dossier numbers 38-43). 46. J. Pajula, 'Maamme eri osien sotilaallinen merkitys nykyisin yoimassa olevien ja Suomea velvoittavien kansainvalisten sopimusten valossa', Sotakorkeakoulu, MSL 19,524/1952, p. 9. 47. Ibid., p. 7. 48. Nils 0rvik,'Defence Against Help - A Strategy for Small States?', Survival, London, September-October 1973. 49. Asetus Puolustuslaitoksesta N:o 358, 31.10.1952; entered into force 1. 12. 1952, Asetuskokoelma 1952. Another law that was part of the 1952 Reorganisation was 'Laki puolustusministeri6n ja puolustuslaitoksen viroista ja toirnista' N:o 241, 6.6.1952; entered into force 1.10.1952, Asetuskokoelma 1952. 50. Tervasmliki, Puolustusneuvosto, p. 175 and Puolustushallinto, pp. 487-8. 51. 'In Finnish Diet', Pravda and Izvestia, 16 May 1952. CDSP Volume IV, No. 21, p. 18. 52. Ibid., p. 18. 53. Ibid., p. 18. 54. Visuri, 'Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys Keski-Euroopassa Toisen Maailmansodan jalkeen vertailtuna vastaavaan kehitykseen Suomessa', E. 175. 55. Paaesikunta, Jalkaviien taisteluohiesiiiinto 11. Patalioonan taistelu, Helsinki 1955, pp. 281-2. 56. Interview with General Koppinen, former Commander of the Finnish Border Guards and the developer of Finnish guerrilla warfare tactics. Espoo, 17 December 1987. 57. S. Enki6, 'Mita jokaisen upseerin tulee tiew atomipommista', Sotilasaikakauslehti 3/1947 and 6/1947. 58. Ibid. See also Jarvinen in Tiede ja Ase, 8/1950 p. 12. 59. R. Arimo, 'Atomipomminja vetypommin vertailua', SAL, 4/1952. 60. Cited in J. O. Valtonen, 'Sotakokemukset ja tulevaisuuden sota' SAL 4/1947. 61. V-P Somerkari, 'Pohjolan asema maailman sotilas-ja geo-poliittisessa voimakentassa' written for a Sotilasaikakauslehti competition in 1950, published in SAL 1/1952. For a later version of the same 'Great Circle Theory' see G. C. Magnusson, 'Lentoase ja Suomen Turvallisuus V', Uusi Suomi, 19 July 1956.

Notes to pp. 55-8 177 62. The Great Circle Theory was popular until missiles replaced bombers as the primary nuclear delivery vehicles. 63. Somerkari, 'Pohjolan asema maailman sotilas - ja geopoliittisessa voimak.entassa', pp. 7-8. 64. The Soviet Union had occupied the island in the spring of 1945 but handed it over to Denmark in 1946. See Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 20-3. 65. Johan Jorgen Holst, Norsk Sik.lcerhetspolitik i Strategisk Perspektiv, Bind II: Dokumentasjon, Oslo 1967, pp. 71-2. 66. For Norway see 'Vapenhjelp' in Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolilik, Bind II, p. 23. For Denmark's military build-up see H. Westergard Andersen, Dansk Politik i gar og i dag, p. 148. 67. Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, pp. 23-4, 120. 68. See 'NATO's infrastrukturprogram' in Holst, Norsk Sikkerhelspolitik, Bind II, p. 23; also a chart on p. 22. 69. Ibid., p. 59. On the Swedish air force see: Dick Stenberg, 'Flygvapnet 1926-76', Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademins /landlingar och Tidskrift, 4/1976. 70. Agrell, Alliansfrihet och atombomber, p. 168. 71. Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 59. 72. The Vampire de Havilland jet was sold to Sweden in the same year, 1946, as it became available for the RAF. Ibid., p. 60. 73. Interview with Colonel Pekuri, former Commander of the Karelian Wing of the Finnish Air Force, Helsinki 2 April 1987. 74. Tervasmliki, Puolustushallinto, p. 303. 75. Ilmavalvonta-asema opas, Paaesikunta, Helsinki, 1952, p. 13-14. The same instructions were repealed in the 1954 Swedish-language version of the same manual. 76. According to General Merio, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Air Force, the letter that initiated the planning was dated 30 April 1949. Interview with General Merio, Tikkakoski, 18 July 1985. 77. According to Merio this was communicated in a letter dated 11 October 1952. Interview with General Merio, Tikkakoski, 18 July 1985. 78. An air force memorandum dated 20 May 1953. Interview with General Merio, Tikkakoski, 18 July 1985. 79. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesla, p. 139. A modern combat radar network was developed in the 1960s. 80. See e.g. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 439. The Finnish government sent a memorandum to the Soviet government on 15 September 1954 as a result of three Soviet jets flying across Finland. 81. G. Co Magnusson, 'Lentoase ja Suomen turvallisuus', Uusi Suomi, 19 July 1956. See also G. E. Magnusson, 'Suomen lentoaseen kehittliminen', Uusi Suomi, 31 January 1956. 82. 'Tutka olennainen osa nykyaikaiscssa ilmapuolustuksessa', Uusi Suomi, 25 November 1955. 'VaestOnsuojclua edellcen kehitettiiva', Uusi Suomi, 22 November 1955.

178 Notes to pp. 58-61 83. 'Vaestonsuojelua edelleen kehitettiivii' Uusi Suomi, 22 November 1955. 84. Paasikivi severely criticised these politicians for their suggestion. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, pp. 419,435. 85. Paasikivi feared that if Finland became dependent on Soviet trade the Finnish communists could disrupt the trade and create a situation in which they could use their good relations with the Soviet leaders as a lever for gaining power in Finland. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, 6 March 1954, p. 404, and 24 March 1954, p. 407. 86. Paasikivi told Torngren to receive the US Ambassador to Finland, Mr McFall, and explain the matter. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, p. 419, 14 May 1954. 87. The invitation was presented by Lebedev, the Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, p. 442. 88. In Paasikivi's view, foodstuffs and other necessary goods had to be stored even in peacetime. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjatll, p. 419, 13 May 1954. 89. The note protested against an alleged co-operation between the Swedish and Norwegian governments in building a naval base in the Trondheim region in northern Norway. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, p. 421-2, 1-2 June 1954. 90. 5 June 1954. Ibid., p. 424. 91. A discussion between the Minister of Defence Emil Skog, the Commander-in-Chief, General Sihvo and Paasikivi on 31 July 1954. Ibid., p. 433. 92. Nils 0rvik, 'Defence Against Help - A Strategy for Small States?' Survival, London, September:""October 1973. 93. Paasikivi on 18 January 1955. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 469. 94. Ibid. 4 The Soviet Withdrawal from the Porkkala Naval Base, 1956 1. Arguments to this effect were made frequently during the Finno-Soviet armistice negotiations. See T. Palm, Moskova 1944: Aseleponeuvottelut maaliskuussaja syyvskuussa 1944, Helsinki 1972, pp. 131-2. 2. Stalin to Paasikivi in 1939,.cited in Eino Kekaliiinen, 'Nain vuokraajamiehittiporkkalaa', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 January 1986. 3. Molotov in armistice negotiations in Moscow in 1944. Palm, Moskova 1944, Helsinki 1972, pp. 131-2. 4. The size of a Soviet regiment at that time has been estimated at 2400 men, while a battalion is believed to have been 600 men, A. I. Radzdievskiji~s Taktika v boevyh primerah (Moscow 1976) cited in Eino KekaIiiinen, 'Niiin vuokraaja miehitti Porkkalaa', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 January 1986. 5. A report by the Finnish Headquarters 28 May 1952, cited in Salminen, Porkkalan palautuksesta Noottikriisiin, p. 14.

Notes to pp. 62-4 179 6. Eino KeldiUlinen, 'Nllin vuokraaja miehitti Porklcalan', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 January 1986. The article is based on the author's thesis at the University of Helsinki. 7. George Maude has presented a similar theory in 'Porklcalan palautus oli osa laajempaa "liennytysoffensiivia", Helsingin Sanomat, 8 December 1985. See also Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 37. 8. Maude, 'Porklcalan palautus oli osa \aajempaa "liennytysoffensiivia"', Helsingin Sanomat, 8 December 1985. 9. However, in strictly legal terms Porkkala could have been seen as a non-neutral enclave on neutral Finnish territory. 10. According to J. Suomi, who has access to President Kekkonen's archives, Lebedev had informed Prime Minister Kekkonen about the Soviet offer even before contacting Paasikivi. See Suomenmaa, 17 January 1987. 11. The fact that the Soviet offer was considered as a barter by Finnish political leaders is revealed in Paasikivi's diary. See Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven ptiivtikirjat II, e.g. 19 August 1955, p.503; I September 1955, p. 505; 8 September 1955, p. 507. 12. The former head of the Political Department of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Max Jakobson, has presented the return of Porklcala in terms of a direct barter: a 20-year extension of the FCMA Treaty in exchange for Porklcala. Jakobson, Kuumalla linjalla, p. 87. 13. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 272. 14. Paasikivi dropped these items from the agenda almost one by one as the negotiations approached. Sec: J. K. Paasikiven ptiiviikirjat II, 6 September 1955, p. 506; 8 September 1955, p. 507; and 12 September 1955, p. 508. 15. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 99. 16. 'Falsehood in guise of restoring truth', Izvestia, 12 February 1955. CDSP Volume VII, No.6. 17. Max Jakobson, Kuumalla /injalla, Helsinki 1966, p. 192. 18. R. W. Pethybridge, A History of Postwar Russia, London 1966, p.43. 19. Jakobson, Kuumalla /injalla, p. 193. 20. For the content of Kekkonen's speech see Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 101. 21. It was Paasikivi who mentioned Finland's desire finally to become a member of the UN to Molotov. Molotov promised to keep the Finnish request in mind. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven ptiiviikirjat II, p.51o. 22. The Nordic Council on its part decided not to discuss security policy issues in its meetings. 23. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 503 and pp.508-9. 24. The same argument is made in connection with the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in William B. Baker, Austria Between East and West 1945-55, Stanford 1966, p. 200.

180 Notes to pp. 65-8 25. See, for example, Roy Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power, Oxford 1977, pp. 46-56. 26. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, Baltimore 1970, pp. 74-5. 27. Pravda, 9 September 1954, cited in Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p. 76. 28. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p. 76. 29. Finland was 'in principle' in favour of the conference. Osmo Apunen, Paasikivi-Kekkosen linja, Helsinki 1977, p. 99. 30. According to certain Finnish scholars this solution to the dilemma formed a model for subsequent Finnish diplomacy. See Jukka Tarkka and Allan Tiitta, /tseniiinen Suomi, Helsinki 1987, p. 207 and Max Jakobson, Veteen piirrettv viiva, pp. 39-40. 31. The concept of 'forward strategy' was introduced by the United States Secretary of State Dulles. Baker, Austria Between East and West, p.201. 32. See Baker, Austria Between East and West 1945-55, p. 201 and Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 76. 33. The recognition of this fact by both superpowers has been seen as the beginning of European d~tente. See e.g. Konrad Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union' in Ginsburgs and Rubinstein (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy toward Western Europe, New York 1978, p. 67. 34. Baker, Austria Between East and West, pp. 200-2. 35. See Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, The Years in Power, p.58. 36. Audrey E. Kurth argues that the Austrian State treaty was largely a product of unilateral actions by the Soviet Union. See A. E. Kurth, 'The Great Powers and the Struggle over Austria', D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1984. Other scholars have noted that the Austrian governrnent recognised the possibilities for a settlement already in January 1954, and began to launch initiatives of its own. See Hanspeter Neuhold, 'The Permanent Neutrality of Austria: A Status Similar to and Different from Sweden's "Not-alignment" in 80 Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, UI, Conference Papers 7, Stockholm 1987, p. 7. 37. See Hanspeter Neuhold, 'The Permanent Neutrality of Austria: A Status Similar to and Different from Sweden's 'Not-alignment' in Bo Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, p. 9. 38. Conrary to Stalin, Khrushchev declared repeatedly in the the 1950s and the early 1960s that any war originating in Europe would certainly escalate to a full scale nuclear war. Although he used strong rhetoric for its deterring effect, he consistently maintained Khrushchev believed that 'neither side would concede defeat before resorting to the use of all weapons, even the most devastating ones', Pravda, 8 March 1961, cited in Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 211. See also Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Detente. Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Relations 1953-84, London 1985, p. 27.

Notes to pp. 68-71 181 39. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.l06. 40. Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union', p. 77. 41. Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union', p. 77. 42. 'The Austrian Federal Government will make a declaration in a fonn which will obligate Austria internationally to practice in perpetuity a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland.' See, for example, Baker, Austria Between East and West, p. 185. 43. The Austrian interpretation of this reference as a justification for armed neutrality was an outgrowth of the fear that the Soviet Union might wish to force Austria into closer co-operation with it. See, Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union', pp. 77-82. 44. Ibid., pp. 77-82. 45. US Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Volume I (/945-56), Washington D.C., 1960, pp. 456-66. 46. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, pp. 182-3. 47. This argument is presented in Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 255-6. 48. Bo Huldt, 'Strategy and the Neutral Buffer State' in Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, p. 53. 49. 'The return of Porkkala was one of the major moves in the neutrality campaign, which the Kremlin launched in the mid-1950s.' Bo Peters son, 'From Avoiding the subject to Outright Criticism: Soviet Commentators and the Vexing Case of Finnish Neutrality', Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, Volume 4: 1, 1987, p. 50. 50. See e.g. G. Ginsburg, 'Neutralism a la Russe' in Ginsburg and Rubinstein (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy towards Western Europe, New York, 1978, p. 23. 51. Jakobson, Veteen piirrettv viiva, p. 78. 52. A Pravda editorial on 15 September 1955, cited in a speech by Member of Parliament M. Rysma during a debate on the extension of the Finno-Soviet FCMA Treaty on 4 October 1955. Vaitiopiiiviit 1955, P6ytiikirjat 11, p. 1218-22. 53. Diplomaticheskii Siovar, Vol. 2., 1961, p.396, cited in P. H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, London 1975, p.180. 54. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 222-5. 55. Wolfe argues that Soviet Union sought to encourage domestic pressures in the Western states for American withdrawals from Europe. See Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p.79. However, no evidence has emerged that the Soviet Union sought the American withdrawal from Central Europe in the mid-1950s. 56. Uusi Suomi, 18 September 1955. 57. See e.g. Matthew P. Gallagher. The Soviet History of World War 11: Myths, Memories and Realities, Chapter 3: 'The Military and the Interpretation of the War', pp. 64-78.

182 Notes to pp. 72-3 58. Kintner and Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, Norman (Univ. of Oklahoma Press) 1968, p. 14. For the text of Stalin's speech in which he introduced these factors see Josef V. Stalin, 'Order of the People's Commissar of Defence, 23 February 1945, No. 55', in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (eds), The Soviet Art of War, Boulder, Colorado 1982, pp. 79-82. 59. The Soviet Union exploded an atomic device in 1949 and a thermonuclear device in 1953, only nine months after the United States exploded its hydrogen bomb. 60. For a compact treatise on the mid-1950s changes in Soviet military thought see Harriet Fast Scott's introduction to V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Stanford 1975, pp. xvii-xxi: 'The Background to Contemporary Soviet Military Thought'. 61. Major General Talenskii was the editor of Military Thought from 1945 to 1954. See Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 65. 62. Nikolai A. Talenskii, 'On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science', in Scott and Scott, The Soviet Art of War, p. 85. 63. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 130. 64. Most of the discussion was carried out in Military Thought, See: Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 130; and J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, London 1962,p.94. 65. Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, New York, 1959, p.52. 66. Pravda 13 March 1954, cited in Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 130. 67. Malenkov's thesis contributed to his downfall and subsequent resignation in February 1955. 68. See Lawrence Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London 1983, pp.145-9. 69. See Laird and Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms, p. 11. 70. A new version of the Bear, the TU-20 became available 1956/57. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 64. 71. Ibid., p. 13. 72. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 143. 73. Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, p. 131. 74. Military Thought, No.3 1955, p. 5, cited in Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, p. 70. 75. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.104. 76. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 248. 77. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.104. 78. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 146-7. 79. See ibid. p. 104; and H. Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the

Notes to pp. 73-6 183 Death of Stalin, London 1972, p. 60. Both authors interpret the return of Porkkala as a withdrawal from exposed salients. 80. Khrushchev's envisioned a move from massive retaliation to the 'nuclearising' of the theatre forces that would allow for a more flexible response. However, this change did not take place before the early 196Os. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 145. 81. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbot, London 1974, p. 224. 82. 'Views on the intention of the fleet and its tasks were formed under the influence of Second World War experience and victory over a strong continental enemy.' Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, p. 179. 83. J. J. Holst, 'Norwegian Security Policy' in Holst (ed.), Five Roads to Nordic Security, Oslo 1973, p. 92. 84. J. J. Holst. 'Norwegian Security Policy', in Holst (ed.), Five Roads to Nordic Security, p. 92. For later trends in Soviet naval exercises, see Donald C. Daniel, 'Trends and Patterns in Major Soviet Naval Exercises', Chapter 12 in Paul J. Murphy (ed.), Naval Power in Soviet Policy, Washington D.C., 1978. 85. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, p. 179. 86. To secure the operations of the new blue-water fleet the Soviet Union began in mid-1950s the development of cruise missile submarines. The first submarines that could launch anti-ship cruise missiles while submerged were completed in the late 1960s. See, Paul J. Murphy, 'Trends in Soviet Naval Force Structure', Ch. 6 in Paul J. Murphy (ed.), Naval Power in Soviet Policy, p. 113. 87. 'The problem of the defence of the Baltic Sea lanes had shsifted from the Gulf of Finland to the Danish Straits.' Allison. Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 37. 88. Ibid., p. 37. 89. This interpretation has become the official diplomatic interpretation of the return of Porkkala. Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen expressed it at the 25th anniversary of the return of Porkkala in 1981: 'The good bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were the primary reason for the return of Porkkala.' Finnish TV News 25 January 1985, 'Ulkomaat' News Archive of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation. 90. See, Uusi Suomi, 22 September 1955. 91. Paasikivi, Paasikiven linja /, Puheita vuosilta 1944-56, pp. 192-4. 92. Krister Wahl back, Mannerheimista Kekkoseen, p. 211. 93. Haikiti, 'YYA-sopimuksen konsultaatioartiklan suomalainen tulkinta', p.41. 5 One-Armed Neutrality, 1956-61 1. 'Message from Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N. A. Bulganin to H. C. Hansen, Prime Minister of Denmark', Pravda, 31 March 1957 and 'Message from Chairman... to -Prime Minister

184 Notes to pp. 77-81 Einar Gerhardsen of Norway', Pravda, 27 March. CDSP Volume IX, No. 12, p. 21. 2. For the complete text of the note warning Norway against permitting the establishment of military bases on Norwegian territory see, The New York Times, 27 March 1957, p. 4. 3. Kekkonen's speech at the National Press Club in Washington on 17 October 1961. UIA 1961, pp. 135-8. See also, Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 89. 4. Kekkonen, 'Good Neighbourliness with the "Hereditary Enemy", Speech given in Stockholm, 7 December 1943, Neutrality p. 18; Broadcast 5 October 1945, Neutrality p. 38. He also made his position clear to the Finnish Commander-in-Chief General Simelius several times. See e.g. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 177. 5. A Finnish Military Journal intervicw with General Siilasvuo, who was involved in the Finnish peacekeeping missions from the beginning and later became the Commander of all UN forces in the Middle East, Sotilasaikakauslehti, 12/1986. 6. Despite the fact that the proposal to send UN troops to Suez came from Canada, Nasser was not prepared to accept a Canadian contingent. Neither did he accept troops from the superpowers. See Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez, The Dual War, London 1979, pp. 176-84. 7. D. J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 418. 8. The Finnish contingent was put together in a short time and was therefore not prepared for an open-ended commitment. See Tauno Kuosa, 'Finland's participation in UN Peacekeeping Activity' in Kanninen (ed.), Aspects of Security, p. 299 and Kalcla, 'The UN Peacekeeping operations', p. 53. 9. Jakobson, Kuumalla linjalla, p. 194. 10. General Siilasvuo in an interview with the Finnish military journal, SAL 12/1986, p. 891. 11. Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystiiviinii, p. 353. 12. Sirnelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 229. 13. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 211, 268 and 269. 14. See Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat p. 469, 18 January 1955. 15. See for example, 'Infantry in Atom War', SAL 2/1956. 'The use of atom bomb places certain extra requirements on our Field Artillery', SAL 7/1956. 'The impact of nuclear explosives on army operations in our conditions', Tiede ja Ase 15/1957 and an article on protection against weapons of massive destruction in Tiede ja Ase, 18/1960. 16. Example cited in Aimo Pajunen, 'Nakokohtia suomalaisesta strategiasta ja puolustuspolitiikasta', a presentation at the Finnish Military Science Society on I March 1966. See also Pajunen's Sarjatulta. 17. Jakobson, Veteen piirrettv viiva, p. 107. 18. B. V. Ganyushkin, Sovremenny neytralitet: politika neytraliteta i nostoyanny neutralitet v usloviyakh borb' by za mir, Moscow: Inst.